Abstract. We introduce finite games with the following types of players: (I) nonatomic players, (II) atomic splittable players, (III) atomic non splittable players. We recall and compare the basic properties, expressed through variational inequalities, concerning equilibria, potential games and dissipative games, as well as evolutionary dynamics. Then we consider composite games where the three types are present, a typical example being congestion games, and extend the previous properties of equilibria and dynamics. Finally we describe an instance of composite potential game.
Introduction
We study equilibria and dynamics in finite games: there are finitely many "participants" i ∈ I and each of them has finitely many "choices" p ∈ S i . The basic variable describing the interaction is thus a profile x = {x i , i ∈ I}, where each x i = {x i p , p ∈ S i } is an element of the simplex X i = ∆(S i ) on S i . Let X = i∈I X i .
We consider three frameworks: (I) Population games where each participant i ∈ I corresponds to a population: a nonatomic set of agents having all the same characteristics. In this setup x i p is the proportion of agents of "type p" in population i.
One can distinguish two kinds of I-player games where each participant i ∈ I stands for an atomic player: (II) Splittable case: x i p is the proportion that player i allocates to p. (The set of pure moves of player i is X i .) (III) Non splittable case: x i p is the probability that player i chooses p. (The set of pure moves is S i and x i is a mixed strategy.)
As an example, consider the following network where a routing game of each of the three frameworks takes place. Assume that arc 1 and arc 2 are connecting o to d. First, in a population game, consider two groups of players going from o to d. Suppose that a proportion x 1 1 of group 1 is taking arc 1 while the rest of the group uses arc 2, and similarly for group 2.
Next, in the splittable case, consider two players who both have a stock to send from o to d and can split their stocks. Suppose that player 1 sends a fraction x 1 1 of his stock by arc 1 and the remaining by arc 2, and similarly for player 2.
Finally, in the non splittable case, still consider two players having to send their stock from o to d. However, they can no longer split their stock, but have to send it entirely by one arc. Suppose that with probability x 1 1 player 1 sends it by arc 1 and with probability x 1 2 = 1 − x 1 1 he sends it by arc 2, and similarly for player 2.
In all the three examples, the basic variables are (x 1 1 , x 2 1 ) ∈ [0, 1] 2 which define x ∈ X.
2. Description of the models 2.1. Framework I: population games. We consider here the nonatomic framework where each participant i ∈ I corresponds to a population of nonatomic players. The payoff (fitness) is defined by a family of continuous functions {F i p , i ∈ I, p ∈ S i }, all from X to R, where F i p (x) is the outcome of a member in population i choosing p, when the environment is given by the basic variable x.
An equilibrium is a point x ∈ X satisfying:
This corresponds to a Wardrop equilibrium [31] .
Proposition 2.1. (Smith [23] and Dafermos [4] ) An equivalent characterization of (1) is through the variational inequality:
or alternatively:
A special class of population games corresponds to games with external interaction where each F i depends only on x −i .
Framework II: atomic splittable.
In this case each participant i ∈ I corresponds to an atomic player with action set X i . Given functions F i p as introduced above, his gain is defined by:
In other words, it is the weighted average gain of all fractions allocated to different choices. An equilibrium is as usual a profile x ∈ X satisfying:
Suppose that for all p ∈ S i ,
Let ∇ i H i (x) stand for the gradient of H i (x i , x −i ) with respect to x i . Then one has [13] :
Proposition 2.2. Any solution of (4) satisfies
Moreover, if each H i is concave with respect to x i , there is equivalence.
Variational inequalities characterizing Nash equilibrium in atomic splittable games (Haurie and Marcotte [9] ) and those characterizing Wardrop equilibrium in nonatomic games have different origins. Inequalities (5) for a Nash equilibrium are obtained as first order conditions, while (2) for a Wardrop equilibrium are derived directly from its definition.
2.3. Framework III: atomic non splittable. We consider here an I-player game where the payoff is defined by a family of functions {G i , i ∈ I}, all from S = i∈I S i to R. We still denote by G the multilinear extension to X where each X i = ∆(S i ) is considered as the set of mixed actions.
An equilibrium is a profile x ∈ X satisfying:
Let VG i denote the vector payoff associated to G i . Explicitly, VG i p :
An equilibrium is thus a profile x ∈ X satisfying:
2.4. Remarks. Framework I and framework III have been extensively studied. III corresponds to games with external interaction and the multilinearity of VG i (x −i ) will not be used. Note that F , ∇H and VG play similar roles in the three frameworks. This can be seen from the three variational characterizations of equilibrium: (2), (5) and (7). We call F , ∇H and VG evaluation functions and denote them by Φ in each of the three frameworks.
From now on, we consider the following class of games which includes i) population games where F i p are continuous on X for all i and p, ii) atomic splittable games where H i is concave and of class C 1 on a neighborhood of X i , and iii) atomic non splittable games. A typical game in this class is denoted by Γ(Φ), where Φ is its evaluation function.
Definition 2.1. NE(Φ) is the set of x ∈ X satisfying:
NE(Φ) is the set of equilibria of Γ(Φ).
The next result recalls general properties of a variational inequality on a convex set.
Theorem 2.1. Let C ⊂ R d be a convex set and Ψ a map from C to R d . Consider the variational inequality:
Four equivalent representations are given by:
where N C (x) is the normal cône to C at x;
where T C (x) is the tangent cône to C at x and [T C (x)] ⊥ its polar;
where Π is the projection operator on a closed convex subset; and
Proof. Ψ(x), x − y ≥ 0 for all y ∈ C is equivalent to Ψ(x) ∈ N C (x). Hence, Ψ(x) ∈ [T C (x)] ⊥ and Π T C (x) Ψ(x) = 0 by Moreau's decomposition [16] . Finally the characterization of the projection gives:
Therefore, Π C [x + Ψ(x)] = x is the solution.
Note that this result holds in a Hilbert space.
3. Potential and dissipative games 3.1. Potential games.
Definition 3.1. A real function W , of class C 1 on a neighborhood Ω of X, is a potential for Φ if for each i ∈ I, there is a strictly positive function µ i (x) defined on X such that
where X i 0 = {y ∈ R |S i | , p∈S i y p = 0} is the tangent space to X i . The game Γ(Φ) is then called a potential game and one says that Φ derives from W .
Some alternative definitions of potential games have been used. Proposition 3.1. Suppose Ω a neighborhood of X. Consider the following two statements:
Then:
Proof. (14): (15) implies that the vector { [20] defines a population potential game by (16) with µ i ≡ 1 for all i. Monderer and Shapley [15] defines potential games for finite games, which is equivalent to our definition (15) in the framework III. Proof. Since a local maximum x of W on the convex set X satisfies:
it follows from (14) that µ i (x)Φ i (x), x i − y i ≥ 0 for all i and for all y ∈ X. This further yields (8) .
On the other hand, if W is concave on X, a solution x of (17) is a global maximum of W on X.
Dissipative games.
Definition 3.2. The game Γ(Φ) is dissipative if Φ satisfies:
It is strictly dissipative if
In the framework of population games, Hofbauer and Sandholm [11] introduce this class of games and call them "stable games".
Notice that if Φ is dissipative and derives from a potential W , it implies that W is concave. The set of equilibria in dissipative games has a specific structure (see [11] ) described as follows.
Definition 3.3. SNE(Φ) is the set of x ∈ X satisfying:
Lemma 3.1.
Proof. Given x * ∈ SNE(Φ), for all x ∈ X and ε ∈ ]0, 1[, define y = εx + (1 − ε)x * . Then, (18) yields Φ(y), x * − x ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X, which implies, by continuity,
On the other hand, if x * ∈ NE(Φ) and Φ is dissipative, by adding Φ(y) − Φ(x * ), x * − y ≥ 0 and Φ(x * ), x * − y ≥ 0, one has x * ∈ SNE(Φ).
A strictly dissipative game Γ(Φ) has a unique equilibrium.
The description is more precise in the smooth case.
is negative semidefinite on T X (x), the tangent cône to X at x.
Proof. Given x ∈ X and z ∈ T X (x), there exists ǫ > 0 such that
Dynamics

Definitions.
The general form of a dynamics describing the evolution of the strategic interaction in game Γ(Φ) isẋ = B Φ (x), x ∈ X, where X is invariant so that for each i ∈ I, B i Φ (x) ∈ X i 0 . First recall the definitions of several dynamics expressed in terms of Φ. [28] )
Replicator dynamics (RD). (Taylor and Jonker
where
is the average evaluation for participant i.
Brown-von-Neumann-Nash dynamics (BNN). (Brown and von Neumann [2]
, Smith [24, 26] , Hofbauer [10] 
Local/direct projection dynamics (LP). (Dupuis and Nagurney [5], Lahkar and Sandholm
where we recall that T X i (x i ) denotes the tangent cône to X i at x i .
4.1.5. Global/target projection dynamics (GP). (Friesz et al. [6] , Tsakas and Voorneveld [29] )
Recall that the two dynamics above are linked by:
Best reply dynamics (BR). (Gilboa and Matsui [7])
General properties.
We define here properties expressed in terms of Φ.
Definition 4.1. Dynamics B Φ satisfies: i) positive correlation (PC) [20] if:
(This corresponds to MAD (myopic adjustment dynamics) [27] : assuming the configuration given, an unilateral change should increase the evaluation); ii) Nash stationarity if: for x ∈ X, B Φ (x) = 0 if and only if x is an equilibrium of Γ(Φ).
Proposition 4.1. (RD), (BNN), (Smith), (LP), (GP) and (BR) satisfy (PC).
Proof.
(1) RD:
The equality holds if and only if for all
(2) BNN:
The equality holds if and only if for all i ∈ I and all p ∈ S i ,Φ i p (x) = 0, in which case B Φ (x) = 0. (3) Smith:
The equality holds if and only if for all q ∈ S i , either
and the equality holds if and only if for all
The second last inequality holds since x i ∈ X i , thus
The equality occurs in both inequalities if and only if x i = Π X i (z i ) for all i ∈ I, in which case B Φ (x) = 0.
(6) BR:
The equality holds if and only if x i ∈ BR i (x) for all i ∈ I, hence B Φ (x) = 0.
Proposition 4.2. (BNN), (Smith), (LP), (GP) and (BR) satisfy Nash stationarity on X.
(RD) satisfy Nash stationarity on int X.
(1) BNN: x ∈ NE(Φ) is equivalent to:Φ p (x) = 0 for all p ∈ S. Hence B Φ (x) = 0. Reciprocally, assume the existence of i ∈ I and p ∈ S i such thatΦ i p (x) > 0. Since there exists q with x i q > 0 andΦ i q (x) = 0, one obtains B i Φ,q (x) < 0, contradiction.
(2) Smith: Assume x ∈ NE(Φ). Then for all i ∈ I and q ∈ S i , either
Reciprocally, assume the existence of i ∈ I and p ∈ S i such that 
for all i ∈ I and p ∈ S i and thus
Reciprocally, if x ∈ int X and B Φ (x) = 0, x is equalizing hence in NE(Φ).
Potential games.
We establish here results that are valid for all three classes of games. Proof. Consider x ∈ X. Let {x t } t≥0 be the trajectory of B Φ with initial point x 0 = x, and V t = W (x t ) for t ≥ 0. Theṅ
(Recall thatẋ t ∈ X 0 .) Moreover, Φ i (x t ),ẋ i t = 0 holds for all i if and only ifẋ = B Φ (x t ) = 0. One concludes by using Lyapunov's theorem (e.g. Th. 2.6.1. in [12] ).
This result is proved in Sandholm [20] for the version of potential games in framework I defined by (16) .
It follows that, with the appropriate definitions, the convergence results established for several dynamics and potential games in framework I extend to all the frameworks. Explicitly: (1) RD: Let x * ∈ NE(Φ). Define [11] :
Then H is a local Lyapunov function. If Γ(Φ) is strictly dissipative, then H is a local strict Lyapunov function.
(2) BNN: Assume Φ C 1 on a neighborhood Ω of X. Define [24, 26, 10] :
Then H is a strict Lyapunov function which is minimal on NE(Φ).
(3) Smith: Assume Φ C 1 on a neighborhood Ω of X. Define [25] :
(4) LP: Let x * ∈ NE(Φ). Define [17, 33, 18] :
Then H is a Lyapunov function. If Γ(Φ) is strictly dissipative, then H is a strict Lyapunov function.
(5) GP: Assume Φ C 1 on a neighborhood Ω of X. Define [19] :
Then H is a Lyapunov function. If Γ(Φ) is strongly dissipative, then H is a strict Lyapunov function.
(6) BR: Assume Φ C 1 on a neighborhood Ω of X. Define [11] :
Proof. For a trajectory of dynamicsẋ = B Φ (x) with initial point
Hence we focus on ∇H(x t ), B Φ (x t ) . The subscript for time t is omitted.
(1) RD: Given an equilibrium x * , define H(x) = i∈I h i (x i ) with h i (x i ) = p∈supp(x i * ) x i * p ln
H has a strict local minimum at x * . In fact, consider the neighborhood of x * in X defined by V = {x ∈ X, supp(x * ) ∈ supp(x)}. The concavity of ln x and Jensen's inequality imply:
and the equality in both inequalities holds if and only if x i = x i * .
Consider a trajectory of the RD dynamics with initial point x 0 ∈ V.
For x = x * , since Γ(Φ) is dissipative (resp. strictly dissipative), one has x − x * , Φ(x) − Φ(x * ) ≤ (resp. <) 0, which implies that x − x * , Φ(x) ≤ (resp. <) x − x * , Φ(x * ) ≤ 0, i.e. ∇H(x), B Φ (x) ≤ (resp. <) 0. Therefore, H is a local Lyapunov function when Γ(Φ) is dissipative. If Γ(Φ) is strictly dissipative then x * is the unique equilibrium, and H is a strict local Lyapunov function.
and for i = j,
Thus, Therefore, H is a strict Lyapunov function. It is clear that H(x) ≥ 0 and the equality holds if and only if for all i ∈ I and all p ∈ S i , Φ i p (x) = 0, i.e. x ∈ NE(Φ).
It follows that:
Recall that
As a consequence, every term in A is non positive. By taking only the terms such that q = l, one obtains:
In addition ∇H(x), B Φ (x) = 0 if and only if for all i ∈ I and all p ∈ S i , either
Clearly, H(x) ≥ 0. And the equality holds if and only if for all i ∈ I and all q ∈ S i , either
because Γ(Φ) is dissipative and x * is an equilibrium. Besides, when Γ(Φ) is strictly dissipative, the equality holds if and only if x = x * , the unique equilibrium. Therefore, H is a global Lyapunov function when F is dissipative. In addition, H is a global strict Lyapunov function when Γ(Φ) is strictly dissipative.
Since:
one has H(x) = L(x, y * (x)) with y * (x) = Π X (x + Φ(x)). By the Envelope theorem:
The first term is negative by property of Π X . The second term is negative because Γ(Φ) is dissipative. Therefore, H is a global Lyapunov function.
Note that H is a global strict Lyapunov function when Γ(Φ) is strongly dissipative.
Finally,
The inequality is due to the definition of projection Π X , and the equality holds if and only if x = Π X (x + Φ(x)), i.e. x ∈ NE(Φ).
. By the Envelope theorem, for anyȳ(x),
The second term is negative because Γ(Φ) is dissipative. Then the equality holds if and only if H(x) = 0 or, equivalently, x ∈ NE(Φ).
Therefore H is a strict Lyapunov function.
Composite Games
Example: congestion game.
An eminent example of the games studied in this paper is network congestion game, or routing game. The underlying network is a finite directed graph G = (V, A), where V is the set of nodes, A the set of links. Vector l = (l a ) a∈A denotes a family of cost functions from R to R + : if the aggregate weight on arc a is m, the cost per unit (of weight) is l a (m). The set I of participants is finite. A participant i is characterized by his weight m i and an origin/destination pair (o i , d i ) ∈ V × V such that the constraint is to send a quantity m i from o i to d i . The set of choices of participant i ∈ I is S i : directed acyclic paths linking o i to d i and available to i. Let P = ∪ i∈I S i .
Assume that, for all arc a ∈ A, the function l a is continuous and finite on a neighborhood U of interval [0, M ] and positive on U ∩ R + , where M = i∈I m i is the aggregate weight of the players.
In each of the three frameworks considered in this paper, a participant is respectively a population of nonatomic players (I), an atomic splittable player (II) and an atomic non splittable player (III). Thus, in framework I, a fraction x i p of population i takes path p; in framework II, x i p is the proportion of the weight m i sent on path p by player i; in framework III, x i p is the probability with which player i take path p. The basic variable x is also called the configuration of the network, and the feasible configuration set is X = i∈I X i .
In frameworks I and II, a configuration x induces a flow f i on the arcs (or simply flow) for participant i. Explicitly, the weight on arc a from participant i is f i a = p∈S i , p∋a m i x i p . Define the aggregate configuration x = (x p ) p∈P , where x p = i∈I,S i ∋p m i x i p . The aggregate flow is f = (f a ) a∈A , with f a = i∈I f i a the aggregate weight on arc a. Notice that f can also be induced by the aggregate configuration x. Denote f −i a = f a − f i a . Given a configuration x, the induced flow f and aggregate flow f , the vector of congestion on the arcs is l(f ) = {l a (f a )} a∈A . This specifies now the cost of a path p by c p (x) = a∈p l a (f a ). The corresponding vectors are c i (x) = (c p (x)) p∈S i for i ∈ I, c(x) = (c i (x)) i∈I , and c(x) = (c p (x)) p∈P .
Besides
The evaluation functions in the first two frameworks are respectively:
, where u i (x) is the cost to atomic player i:
In framework III, first consider the arc flow f and aggregate arc flow f induced by a purestrategy profile s: f a (s) = i∈I f i a (s) and f i a (s) = m i 1 a∈s i . Then the evaluation function is
, where
Congestion games are thus natural settings where each kind of participants occurs. However one can even consider a game where participants of different natures coexist: some of them being of type I, II or III. This leads to the notion of composite game.
In addition, congestion games are a natural example of an aggregative game (see [22] ) where the payoff of a participant i depends only on x i ∈ X i and on some fixed dimensional function
Theorem 5.1. x ∈ X is a composite equilibrium of the composite game Γ(Φ) if and only if
In framework II, u i is of class C 1 and convex when the arc cost functions satisfy a mild condition, as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 5.1. In Γ(Φ), if each cost function l a is of class C 1 , nondecreasing and convex on U , for all arc a ∈ A, then u i (x i , x −i ) is convex with respect to x i on a neighborhood of X i for all fixed x −i ∈ X −i .
Proof. In order to prove that u i (x i , x −i ) is convex with respect to x i , it is sufficient to show
Suppose that y i induces arc flow g i for player i. For all arc a, the cost function l a is convex, which implies
and l a nondecreasing gives
This is a reformulation of (20) 
, and moreover
Here l ′ a (·) stands for the derivative function of l a (·).
Composite games and variational inequalities.
We have seen that the properties of equilibrium and dynamics in the three frameworks all depend on the evaluation function Φ and the variational inequalities associated to it. Based upon this idea, let us define a more general class of games called composite games, which exhibit different types of players. Composite congestion games with participants from frameworks I and II have been studied by Harker [8] , then Boulogne et al. [1] , Yang and Zhang [32] and Cominetti et al. [3] , etc. Consider a finite set I 1 of populations composed of nonatomic players, a finite set I 2 of atomic splittable players and a finite set I 3 of atomic non splittable players. Let I = I 1 ∪ I 2 ∪ I 3 .
All the analysis of sections 3 and 4 extend to these configurations where x = {x i } i∈I 1 ∪I 2 ∪I 3 and Φ i p (x) depends upon the type of participant i. Explicitly, there are finitely many "participants" i ∈ I and each of them has finitely many "choices" p ∈ S i . x i = {x i p , p ∈ S i } belongs to the simplex X i = ∆(S i ) on S i and X = i∈I X i . For i ∈ I 1 , the payoff F i p , p ∈ S i is a continuous function on X and Φ i = F i . For i ∈ I 2 , F i p , p ∈ S i is a continuous function on X and the payoff H i (x) = x i , F i (x) is concave and of class C 1 on a neighborhood of
p is continuous on X −i , the payoff is G i (x) = x i , VG i (x −i ) and Φ i = VG i . Let this composite game be denoted by Γ(Φ). An example of such a composite game is a congestion game with the three types of participants in a network where the arc cost function l a for all a ∈ A is of class C 1 , nondecreasing and convex on U , a neighborhood of [0, M ], where M is the total weight of the players. Indeed, it is clear that Lemma 5.1 still holds in the presence of populations and of atomic non splittable players in addition to splittable players.
Composite potential games and composite dynamics.
Once the equilibria of a composite game are formulated in terms of solutions of variational inequalities, those properties of equilibria and dynamics based on such a formulation in the three frameworks discussed so far are naturally inherited in the composite setting.
The general form of a dynamics in a composite game is Γ(Φ) is agaiṅ
The definitions of positive correlation and Nash stationarity for B Φ are exactly the same as in Definition 4.1. Arguments similar to those for Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 show the following.
Proposition 5.1. In composite game Γ(Φ), composite dynamics (Smith), (BNN), (LP), (GP) and (RD) satisfy (PC) and Nash stationarity on X.
(RD) satisfies (PC) and Nash stationarity on intX.
The definition of a potential game and a dissipative game for composite games are analogous to those for each of the three frameworks. The corresponding properties of composite dynamics for these specific classes of composite games can be proved in the same way as for Propositions 4.4 and 4.5.
Definition 5.1. A composite game Γ(Φ) is a composite potential game if there is a real-valued function W of class C 1 defined on a neighborhood Ω of X, called potential function, and strictly positive functions µ i , i ∈ I on X such that for all x ∈ X,
where Denote by s = (s k ) k∈I 3 ∈ S 3 = A I 3 a pure strategy profile of participants in I 3 and let z = ((x i ) i∈I 1 , (x j ) j∈I 2 , (s k ) k∈I 3 ). Let f (z) be the aggregate flow induced by the pure-strategy profile z. Namely: f a (z) = i∈I 1 m i x i a + j∈I 2 m j x j a + k∈I 3 m k 1 {s k =a} . Theorem 5.2. Assume that for all a ∈ A, the per-unit cost function is affine, i.e. l a (u) = b a u + d a , with b a > 0 and d a ≥ 0. Then a composite congestion game on this network is a potential game. A potential function defined on X is given by:
with µ i (x) ≡ m i for all i ∈ I = I 1 ∪ I 2 ∪ I 3 and all x ∈ X.
Proof. First notice that the function W defined in (22) is the multilinear extension of the following function defined on Z, the set of pure-strategy profiles:
The per-unit cost to take arc a when the pure-strategy profile is z is c a (z) = b a f a (z) + d a , for all arc a ∈ A.Recall that this is the opposite of the evaluation for the nonatomic players in population i ∈ I 1 : Φ i a (z) = −c a (z), i ∈ I 1 . On the other hand,
For an atomic splittable player j ∈ I 2 , when the pure strategy profile is z, the cost is u j (z) = 
Finally, for an atomic non splittable player k ∈ I 3 , the cost to take arc a when the other players play z −k is u k (z −k , a) = b a f a (z −k , a)) + d a = Φ k a . On the one hand,
On the other hand,
